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This brief is presented on behalf of R. A. l\Ienlove, 
for himself and as President of Salt Lake County .Motel 
Association. 
l 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
On the 27th day of July, 1965, the Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County passed and adopted 
an ordinance entitled "Transient Room Tax Ordinance 
of the County of Salt Lake," to become effective at 
12 o'clock noon on the 1st day of August, 1965. Said 
ordinance was adopted by virtue of Chapter 31, Title 
17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The 
amendment in question was passed by the 1965 Legis-
lature sitting in regular session, which provided for 
an increase of the sales tax from 3% to 41/2% on persons 
occupying motel and hotel rooms and other similar 
accommodations for a period of fewer than 30 days to 
be collected by the State Tax Commission. 
The appellant herein filed an action in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, contesting 
the validity of said ordinance on the ground that it 
was unconstitutional, unlawful and ultra viris and 
would, if enforced, result in irreparable damage to 
appellant. Respondent, Salt Lake County, through its 
County Attorney, answered said complaint and also 
filed its motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After 
hearing arguments on said motion, the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson granted respondent's motion and 
entered judged as prayed. 
This is an appeal from said judgment. 
2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
It is the contention of appellants that the ordinance 
in question is unconstitutional and in violation of the 
due process of law and the equal protection of the law 
provisions of the state and federal constitution for the 
following reasons: 
l. The classification of taxpayers in the ordinance 
is contrary to constitutional law. 
2. The act is arbitrary and unlawful because it 
taxes a class of persons who receive no benefits there-
from. 
3. Summary judgment on the pleadings was un-
lawful because it deprived appellant of his constitutional 
right to prove the arbitrary and discriminatory nature 
of the ordinance. 
ARGUMENT 
l. ClMsification of Taxpayers in the ordinance is 
unconstitutional. 
The ordinance in question provided for a tax on 
temporary occupants of hotels, motels and other accom-
modations. It is a personal tax which must be paid 
by such occupants and is not charged to the owners of 
the accommodations, whose responsibility under the act 
is to collect the tax for the taxing authorities. In other 
words, the classification set up by the ordinance is a 
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classification of persons for taxation purposes and not 
a classification of property. 
It is undisputed that legislatures have wide author-
ity to classify property for taxation and courts have 
universally sustained legislative classifications of prop-
erty both real and personal, unless abusive elements of 
discrimination appear within the classifications. But 
Courts lrnYe generally frowned upon classifications of 
persons or taxpayers (not their property) for the impo-
sition of personal taxes. Such classifications have re-
peatedly been held to be prohibited by the 14th Amend-
ment, particularly when the objective of the classifi-
cation was to favor one group of taxpayers to the 
detriment of the other. Courts hold closely to the 
doctrine that all political power is inherent in the 
people and that government is instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit. Courts are unwilling to disregard 
that mandate by dividing people into separate groups 
for taxation purposes. 
The Ohio Supreme Court in the case of State ex 
rel Struble vs. Davis et al, 9 NE 2nd 684, clarified the 
distinction between property classification and personal 
classification of taxpayers with the following language: 
"However, a classification to be valid must 
be a classification of property-the subject of 
taxation-and not a classification of taxpayers, 
as was the situation under consideration in the 
case of State ex rel Hostetter vs. Hunt et al, 
9 NE 2nd 676, this day decided." P 688 (2). 
In the Hunt case, the Court said, P. 681 (8): 
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"In order to determine whether a law is for 
the equal protection and benefit of the people 
it is necessary to ascertain whether it operates 
equally upon all persons charged with the same 
obligation. If the result of the operation of the 
law is such that some persons are obliged to pay 
taxes on certain kinds of property for certain 
years while other persons owning the same kind 
of property during the same years are released 
from such obligations, it cannot in good con-
science be said that such a measure conforms to 
the equal protection clause of the Constitution." 
On Page 683 it continues: 
"While the classification amendment effective 
January l, 1931, gave the General Assembly the 
authority to classify personal property for the 
purpose of taxation, it did not give the legisla-
ture the power to classify taxpayers so as to dis-
tribute the burden of taxation unequally. The 
statute under consideration does attempt to 
divide taxpayers into two classes. To sanction 
such legislation enacted in violation of Section 
2 of Article l of the constitution would be an 
injudicious construction of constitutional law. 
To say that such classification comes within the 
equal protection clause of the Constitution is to 
misunderstand their true purpose." 
"A classification to be valid must be a classi-
fication of property and not a classification of 
taxpayers." Ireland v. EYatt, 32 NE 2nd 847. 
Most courts adhere to this doctrine and ref use to 
uphold legislative efforts to classify taxpayers. The 
Utah Supreme Court did so in the case of Moon Lake 
Electric Association vs. Utah State Tax Commission, 
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345 P2nd 612. In that case the legislature classified 
corporations into Co-op and non Co-op groups for the 
purpose of giving to the Co-op group special tax con-
cessions not enjoyed by the other group. Even though 
it was shown that such a classification would be bene-
ficial to the people of the state and was much desired, 
the Court nullified the act and refused to sanction such 
a classification of taxpayers. 
The basic doctrine upon which our government 
was founded was that all men are created equal and 
that all have equal rights and opportunities under the 
law. Such a concept of government makes it prohibitive 
to impose direct taxes on people and to then classify 
the taxpayers so that some citizens are given special 
consideration. Their property can be classified and there 
is nothing in the constitution of the state of Utah or 
of the Federal Government which forbids such classi-
fications, but direct taxes on individuals must reach 
everyone alike. Such direct taxes as Poll Taxes, Sales 
and Luxury Taxes apply to all people alike. Tax rates 
and regulations are universal in their application. The 
legislature has no authority under the constitution to 
classify the taxpayers themselves for the purpose of 
imposing separate benefits or advantages to any class. 
Such taxes must be made to apply alike to all persons. 
In fact it seems hard to conceive of any classification 
of taxpaypers where a levy is made directly on them, 
wherein the purpose of the classification was not to 
favor one group as against another. It appears that 
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any variation from uniformity in taxation imposed 
directly on taxpayers is discriminatory. 
Applying this doctrine to the instant case makes 
it clear that the ordinance in question is in violation 
of the equal rights provisions of both State and Federal 
Constitutions. 
The ordinance is titled as a room occupancy tax, 
but a reading of the ordinance shows that it is nothing 
more than an increase of the Sales Tax rate on certain 
persons which the legislature designated as "transients." 
It is a clear cut classification of taxpayers into two 
groups, and an imposition of a tax burden levied on 
one group and exempting the other. 
Attempts of legislatures to use language to cover 
up the true purpose of legislation is quite common. In 
such cases the United States Supreme Court has out-
lined the responsibilities of the Courts which interpret 
legislation of this nature, in the following language: 
Wisconsin vs. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435. 
"In whatever language a statute is framed, its 
purpose must be determined by its natural and 
reasonable effect. In passing on its constitu-
tionality we are concerned only with its practical 
operation, not its definition or the precise form 
of descriptive words which may be applied to 
it." 
The ordinance m the instant case classifies tax-
payers into two groups for the purpose of ra1smg 
revenue to advertise the County. One group is com-
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posed of "transients" who occupy rental accommoda-
tions in hotels, motels and other similar accommodations 
for less than 30 days, and the other group is made up 
of all other taxpayers, those who occupy such rental 
accommodations for more than 30 days as well as all 
other temporary and permanent residents of the county. 
Percentage wise only a very small percentage of people 
who reside in Salt Lake County for any length of time 
must pay the tax under the classification in the ordi-
nance. 
It is obvious that most tourists or transients reside 
in hotels and motels for less than 30 days at a time. 
It is also well known that many of them reside in such 
places for more than 30 days at a time. Under the 
ordinance the one group is taxed and the other ex-
empted. l\1any transients who remain in the county 
for more than 30 days change hotels and motels, some-
times several times, during the period of their stay in 
the County. In such cases those who stay in one place 
are exempt while the ones who move during the month 
are taxed. Such a classification is discriminatory, un-
reasonable and unrealistic for it is set up so as to tax 
some and exempt others of the same class. If tourists 
or transients are to be taxed for any purpose, the tax 
being a direct tax on all taxpayers, must reach all alike. 
Under our form of government a classification of these 
persons so as to tax some of them and exempt others 
is highly discriminatory and unconstitutional. 
Referring again to the language of the Court m 
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the Wisconsin vs. J.C. Penney case, supra, the "natural 
nnd reasonable effect" and the "practical operation" 
of the ordinance is clearly discriminatory even as be-
tween transients. 
Many transients in our state reside in other places 
than hotels, motels and places of similar nature. These 
enjoy all of the advantages offered by the county to 
transients and yet they escape the tax entirely. Most 
of the money spent in the county by transients is spent 
for other things than sleeping accommodations, yet the 
entire burden and expense of collecting the tax is placed 
on motel and hotel operators while all other business 
organizations escape this burden. Such conditions 
imposed by the ordinance are unreasonable and unjust 
and discriminatory. 
2. The act is discriminatory and unconstitutional 
because it taxes a class of people who receive no benefit 
therefrom. 
A classification which places a tax on persons who 
receive nothing in return is unlawful. A universally 
accepted axiom of the law is the following: "In classi-
fying for taxation, an obligation on the taxing powers 
to make available some benefit to them must exist." 
Referring again to the J. C. Penney case, supra, the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
"The test of whether property is taken with-
out due process of law, or if paraphrase we must, 
whether the taxing power exerted by the state 
bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities 
9 
and benefits given by the state, the simple but 
controJling question is whether the state has 
given anything for which it can ask a return." 
The court held that if the taxpayer received nothing 
the tax was an arbitrary one in violation of the 14th 
Amendment. 
It is conceded that when tax revenues go into a 
fund for the operation of government, the taxpayer 
receives ample returns for the taxes he pays through 
police, fire and many other advantages provided 
for him and all citizens by the government. But such 
is not the case in the instant case. The ordinance spe-
cifically provides that 
"No fund collected and received by Salt Lake 
County by virtue of the tax imposed hereby shall 
be used for any purpose other than establishing, 
financing and promoting recreational, tourist 
and convention bureaus." (Section 5 of the 
ordinance) . 
In other words, all of the returns from the tax shall 
be used to set up bureaus to advertise and promote 
Salt Lake County. Such bureaus are set up for the 
benefit of the businesses of the county, and the purpose 
of the bureau is to induce tourists to come to Salt Lake 
County to spend their money with local business estab-
lishments. Salt Lake County businesses receive all of 
the benefits of the tax money. Certainly no one coul<l 
seriously contend that the "natural and reasonable" 
effect of the tax or the "practical effect" thereof could 
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possibly inure to the benefit of the tourist or transient 
who pays it, or to anyone except those who pay none 
of the tax under the terms of the ordinance. The State 
Legislature and the Salt Lake County Commission 
have hit upon a unique plan which imposes a tax on a 
few people who receive no benefit from it to pay for 
the advertising of the county for the sole benefit of 
non-payers of the tax. Applying the language of Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter in the .J. C. Penney case, supra, 
to the instant case, it becomes apparent that the ordi-
nance is unconstitutional for it gives nothing to transient 
guests in motels and hotels for which it can ask tax 
payments in return. This makes the tax an arbitrary 
one in violation of both Federal and State Constitutions. 
The discrimination is extended to the appellant 
and other operators of hotels and motels, for the act 
imposes upon them the discriminatory responsibility 
and entire expense of collecting the tax even though 
only a very small percentage of the dollars spent by 
transients in Salt Lake County is spent for hotel and 
motel accommodations. 
If it is legal and advisable for the legislature of 
Utah to authorize a tax to advertise Utah, it should 
have enacted a tax law which would reach all of the 
people of the state - the ones who will receive the 
benefits from such advertising; or a tax which would 
reach all occupants of hotels and motels, instead of 
a few of them, for the legislature has no authority to 
classify taxpayers for the purpose of imposing a burden 
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on a few for the benefit of others, as has been pointed 
out above. 
3. Snmmary Judgment on Pleadings was unlawful. 
It is universally accepted that though legislative 
bodies have authority to classify property for taxation 
purposes. It is also universally accepted that any arbi-
trary or discriminatory classification of such property 
is unconstitutional. Every taxpayer has the right to 
be heard on such an issue and to present evidence that 
a tax imposed upon him is in violation of the consti-
tution. 
The appellant in the instant case pleaded that the 
ordinance referred to herein was unconstitutional, dis-
criminatory and unlawful. The only way he had of 
protecting his rights under the constitution was to offer 
evidence proving that the ordinance in question was 
causing him to suffer irreparable damage because of 
its unconstitutionality. The Summary Judgment en· 
tered by the court on the pleadings was improper and 
did deprive appellant of his right to offer evidence in 
support of the allegations in his pleadings. 
For the court to dismiss the proceedings of appel-
lant on summary judgment without giving appellant 
the right to present evidence showing that the act was 
discriminatory as to him or that it was palpably arbi-
trary or grossly unequal in its application to the appel-
lants was error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because of the unconstitutionality of the transient 
tax ordinance passed by Salt Lake County Commission 
on the points discussed herein, appellant prays that 
the act be nullified by the court and the summary judg-
ment of the lower court be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HERBERT B. MAW 
Attorney for Appellants 
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